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Tom Regan on Animal Rights, Inherent Values, and Ecology"�"Deep  
In "Two Conceptions of an Envi­
ronmental Ethic and Their Implica­
tions" (this journal, IV/4, December, 
1983), Evelyn PI u ha r has ex pertly and 
meticulously explicated a basic dis­
tinction in environmental ethics: that 
of holism and individualism. This 
distinction may be as fundamental to 
environmental ethics as is naturalism/ 
idealism to metaphysics, rationalism/ 
empiricism to epistemology, and utili­
ty/deontology to ethics. As with 
these other philosophical bifurcations, 
I believe, as does Pluhar, that neither 
holism or individualism can be suc­
cessfully subsumed under the other in 
a comprehensive and consistent envi­
ronmental ethic. 1 In this essay, I 
would like to examine critically one 
attempt, that of Tom Regan, to artic­
ulate an environmental ethic upon a 
strongly individualistic foundation­
namely, upon the concept of "rights 
of nature," which, in turn, he 
derives from a theory of "inherent 
value." Regan's attempt is impresive 
in the scope of his enterprise, in the 
clarity and eloquence of his language, 
and in the subtlety and structure of 
his argument. For all that, I believe 
that he fails to accomplish his objec­
tives. However, as is so often the 
case, the lessons learned through 
errors of this skillful philosophical 
effort may prove to be of considerable 
value to further investigation. 
Early in his book, All that Dwell 
Therein, Regan writes: "I wanted to 
provide vegetarianism with a moral 
basis without resting it on extremely 
controversial moral views. "2 Because 
th isis sou nd strategy for a ph i loso­
pher to adopt in defense of any posi­
tion, it would be appropriate to ask 
whether Regan has, in defending his 
basic views on animal rights and 
environmental ethics, avoided "ex­
tremely controversial" assumptions. I 
submit that he has not, but rather 
that he has utilized, and failed to 
defend effectively, th ree crucial yet 
highly controversial, and perhaps 
untenable, assumptions: (a) that 
there are no morally significant dif­
ferences between humans and other 
animals; (b) that "inherent value," as 
Regan defines it, is an intelligible 
concept, and (c) that the views in 
defense of "animal rights" presented 
here are comp.atible with a "deep eco­
logical" approach to environmental 
ethics. These claims, I will argue, 
are countered by a large and familiar 
body of refuting arguments, highly 
regarded and widely supported, both 
within and beyond the philosophical 
profession. Regan's difficulties arise, 
in large part, from his allegiance to 
what Pluhar calls an "individualistic 
conception of an environmental ethic." 
Near the close of this essay, I will 
suggest how many of these pitfalls 
might be avoided through an accomo­
dation of "individualism" and "holism" 
in environmental ethics. 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Rega n' s most recu r rent st rategy 
for validating animal rights is to dem­
onstrate that if human beings can be 
said to have rights, some animals can 
likewise be said to have rights. (1) 
This argument is based, in turn, on 
the propositions that (a) human and 
animal experiences and interests may 
be "comparable" (8, 12, 86) or even 
"equal" (31-2, 50, 86), (b) Human 
and animal experiences differ in 
degree but not in kind (159), and (c) 
no traits that are universal among 
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humans are exclusive to them (28, 
36) . 3 Th re is a la rge body of pub­
lished opinion that would deny (a) 
and (b), and whi,ch would hold that 
(c), though true, is unsupportive of 
Regan I s concl usion. 
It is crucial, at the outset, to 
point out that, in attempting to derive 
animal rights though an analogy 
between an imals and humans, Regan 
fails to come to terms with the 
strongest rival position: namely, the 
argument that so-called "human 
rights" attach, not to "humans" (a 
biological category) but to "persons" 
(a moral category) and "potential per­
sons." (Pluhar repeats this error, on 
pp. 111-2.) "Personhood" refers to a 
set of capacities-self-conciou sness, 
self-awareness, rationality, ability to 
act on principle, etc.-which are poss­
essed by most members of the species 
homo sapiens , and, to the best ofou r 
knowledge, by no other animals in a 
remotely compa rable deg ree and ki nd. 
This close (though imperfect) correla­
tion between species and capacity-set 
leads to the common, though strictly 
incorrect, term "human rights. " 
Regan's analysis takes advantage of 
this linguistic inaccuracy. (The error 
is also rampant in public discussions 
of "the right to life" of fetuses.) 
The defender of "person-rights" 
(rather than "human-rights") will 
have a much easier time responding to 
Regan's arguments, for the simple 
reason that he will readily accord 
these rights to any nonhuman being 
(animal, cybernetic, or extra-terres­
trial) shown to possess personal 
traits. However, this advocate would 
claim, it is a simple empirical fact that 
no such beings have yet been shown 
to exist. 
It does not follow from this analy­
sis that nonhumans possess no rights 
whatever. Several philosophers have 
argued that sentient animals have a 
right to humane treatment. 4 How­
ever, no animals can be said to have 
such "person-rights" as "freedom of 
worship," or a "right to a college 
education," simply because they have 
no capacity to exercise such rights. 
What, then, of so-called "marginal 
cases" of human beings with only par­
tial or potential person-traits? As 
with animals, they might be accorded 
such rights as they have the capacity 
to exercise. Also, potential persons, 
such as infants or temporarily coma­
tose i'ndividuals, are plausibly 
accorded rights "in anticipation" of 
later capacities. But again, personal 
capacity, not species membersh ip, is 
the key to such an analysis of rights. 
Surely it is, to say the least, a prom­
inent analysis among philosophers who 
deal with this issue. s Yet it is not 
the approach adopted by Regan (or 
Pluhar), who repeatedly writes of 
"humans" (as a species) and only 
rarely of "persons. "6 
Why should "personhood" loom so 
large in a philosophical analysis of 
human and animal rights? Essentially 
for these reasons: (a) the quality of 
personal life, and of the experience 
therein, may be fundamentally differ­
ent from that of non-personal life; (b) 
this qualitative difference is such that 
personal life may be said to be richer, 
more comprehensive, and more valua­
ble to the person, than a life of a 
non-personal being to that being; and 
(c) "personhood" denotes a set of 
capacities that appears to be exclusive 
to the human species (a contingent 
fact), though not universal thereto. 7 
If these claims can be sustained, then 
it follows that the rights of persons 
(i.e., most humans) are both more 
comprehensive and more stringent that 
the rights of relevant non-persons 
(i. e., some animals). This, of 
course, is a conclusion to which 
Regan strenuously objects. 
Why, then, should personal life, 
contrary to Regan's contention, be 
qualitatively different? The key, most 
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commentators ag ree, is language, 
defined, not as "sign communication," 
but as a syntactically structured sys­
tem of significant symbols. 8 With lan­
guage, an organism is able to 
respon d, not on Iy to menta I images of 
objects of experience (a capacity per­
haps attainable without language), but 
also to types (abstractions), facts (as 
propositions), projections, hypoth­
eses, time frames, argument forms, 
and moral principles. Fu rthermore, 
all this and more can, through gram­
mar, be combined and structured in 
an inexhaustible variety of ways. 
Fin a II y , t h ro ugh Ia ng uage, 0 ne may 
acquire a self-concept, and view one­
self as a n entity conti n u ing th roug h 
time. 
In view of all this, Regan's treat­
ment of "the language difference" is 
remarkably restrictive. Though the 
poi nt of view out Iined above has been 
extensively and recently argued by 
philosophers (such as Mead, Dewey, 
Cassi rer , Langer, Wittgenstei n) and 
many linguists, psychologists, and 
anthropologists, Regan chooses instead 
to take on Rene Descartes-and no one 
else. (6-7) Regan writes: "one might 
dispute the view that being able to 
use a language is a necessary condi­
tion of being a conscious being." (6) 
Later he asserts: whether or not a 
person is experiencing pain ... does 
not depend on his being able to per­
form one or another linguistic feat." 
(7, cf. 32) However, by "linguistic 
feat," Regan seems to mean the 
capacity to spea k or write-i. e., to 
"produce" discourse. He thus dis­
misses "the linguistic difference:" 
Imagine a person whose vocal 
cords have been damaged to 
such an extent that he no 
longer has the ability to utter 
words or even to make inarti­
culate sounds, and whose arms 
have been pa ralyzed so that he 
cannot write, but who, when 
his tooth abcesses, twists and 
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turns on his bed, grimaces and 
sobs. We do not say "Ah, if 
on Iy he cou Id sti II spea k, we 
could give him something for 
his pain. As it is, ~ince he 
ca n not spea k, there's noth ing 
we need give him. For he 
feels no pain." We say he is 
in pain, despite his loss of the 
ability to say so. (6-7) 
Here Regan attacks a position with 
no adherents, and draws our attention 
from a significant rival position. Of 
course, animals and language-deprived 
humans can suffer pain, and may be 
said to have a right not to endure 
gratuitous pain. However, paralyzed 
humans who cannot "perform linguistic 
feats" may not be language-deprived, 
since there may be a -g reat dea I 
"goi ng on inside. " Spea king and 
writing, in fact, are not even the 
most significant "linguistic feats." 
They are, instead, the outward mani­
festations of an inward accomplishment 
which supports advanced thought-the 
basis of uniquely personal (presum­
ably human) experiences. 
With language and person hood, 
life-quality is transformed. The life 
and experiences of persons and of 
non-persons are no longer "compara­
ble;" they are "different in kind." 
Regan would have us believe other­
wise. His defense of "animal rights," 
as we have noted, stands repeatedly 
on the contention that human and ani­
mal experiences might be regarded as 
"comparabl'"e, or even "I" an dequa, 
thus that human and animal "inter­
ests" and "rights" mig ht be "eq ua I. " 
Such a contention seems to rest upon;· 
a presumption that human and animal 
lives, like safe-deposit boxes contain­
ing coins and notes of debit, are com­
posed of discrete and transferable 
iexperiential (and derivatively moral) 
counters. But surely, this is not how 
it is. Because experiences are inter­
active, organic, and systemic, an 
"autobiography" is more thana sum of 
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discrete sequential experiences. Be­
cause human experiences are contex­
tual, they come out of an ongoing 
life, and affect the future of that life. 
Experiences which "happen to" a life-a 
stubbed toe, a toothache, an unex­
pected prize, etc., have sense, mean­
ing, value, in the context of that life. 
Thus the quality of a pleasure or pain 
can not be assessed apart from the 
quality of the life it happens "in" or 
"to"-apart from the matrix of atti­
tudes, expectations and evaluations 
that make up that life. Now if, as 
Regan's argument seems to require, 
the differences between human and 
animal lives are simply matters of 
degree (not kind, cf. 159) among iso­
lated phenomenal bits, then some 
sense and use may be made of his 
arguments by analogy. Our account 
of "personhood" seems to suggest, 
however, that this position is radically 
mistaken. Humans, qua persons, deal 
with each other in conversation and 
with themselves in thought, with and 
th roug h concepts a rticu lated th roug h 
syntactical language. They think 
abstractly of themselves, of others, of 
commu nity, of time, of thei r past and 
future, of concepts such as rationality 
and of morality. As persons, humans 
experience unique dimensions of men­
tal and emotional pain; self-reproach, 
dread of impending loss, regret for 
abandoned projects, fear of death, 
and such moral sentiments as guilt 
and shame. Persons also uniquely 
enjoy such pleasu res as self- respect, 
intellectual and creative accomplish­
ment, patriotism, irony, humor and 
pride. In sum the transcending and 
transforming fact that human beings 
are persons gives them a moral con­
siderability far beyond that of ani­
mals. Thus if we regard the human 
condition of personhood seriously, tal k 
of "comparability" or even "equality" 
of experiences of animals and human 
beings becomes unsupportable. 
Having said all this, we must not 
coast off the deep end. In 
pa rticu la r, acknowledgment of these 
significant differences does not entail 
that animal experiences do not morally 
"matter," and that gratuitous torture 
of animals is not morally reprehensi­
ble. However different and even 
unknowable animal pain may be, it is 
pain nonetheless. Furthermore, this 
point of view need not be regarded as 
"species chauvinism." If homo sapiens 
is the only terrestrial personal spec­
ies, this is a contingent fact. Per­
sonal capacities, and the entailed 
transformation of experience, are log­
ically attributable to any creature. 
The limitation thereof is based upon 
empirical fact and circumstance. If 
we were to discover that chimps or 
dolphins could be educated to person­
hood, our moral stance toward them 
would and should be radically trans­
formed. So too if we were to encoun­
ter an extra-terrestrial person. 
Indeed, if recent experiments with 
"ape language" are as significant as 
some claim then a reassessment of ou r 
moral stance toward these cousins is 
overdue. 
Inan effective defen se of human 
rights, Regan points out that: "The 
world contains individuals (e.g., 
human beings) who not only are alive 
but have a life; these individuals are 
not mere things (objects), they are 
the subjects of a life; they have, in 
James Rachels' helpful phrase, autob­
iographies." (70, cf. 94, 135) Pre­
dictably, he then attempts to extend 
this argument to animals. 9 It won't 
do. While some non-personal animals 
may be said to "have a life," being 
without time- a nd self-consciousness 
they can scarcely be said to have 
"autobiographies." Given these di­
mensions of consciousness in personal 
life, the significance of one's life to 
oneself is utterly transformed. A 
steer does not look upon its scheduled 
slaughter with the sense of dread and 
foreboding suffered by a condemned 
prisoner. "Capital punishment" for 
beasts simply makes no sense (as 
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Regan himself tacitly admits, 150-2). 
To a person, 'a life-his life-is a conti­
nuity and a unity. This phenomeno­
logical fact entails rights to life that 
are unique to persons. 
Regan asks: "on what grounds, 
precisely, might it be claimed that no 
animals can reason, make free choices, 
or form a concept of themselves?" 
(13) The answer is richly repre­
sented in recent philosophical, lin­
guistic and psychological literature: 
on the grounds that animals lack 
articulate languages-a rejoinder that 
Regan has utterly failed to address. 
He continues, "what one would want 
[to support th is claim] are detai led 
analyses of these cooperative concepts 
together with rationally compelling 
empirical data and other arguments 
that support the view that all non-hu­
man animals are deficient in these 
respects." (13) Again, there are 
such arguments, based upon wel\­l-
known studies of problem-solving 
skills with and without language, 
studie,s of aphasia, of animaJ behavior, 
of ch i Id ren raised without la nguag.e, 
of language-using blind-deaf (e.g., 
Helen Keller), and more. In addition, 
there is a vast philosophical literature 
on the function of language in per­
sonality. Among the prominent con­
tributors to this field of study are 
Mead, Dewey, Cassirer, Langer, Witt­
genstein and Chomsky (to offer only a 
small sample). None of the above are 
indexed in Regan's book and, after 
two careful readings of the book, I 
can recall none of them being men­
tioned in this regard. All these 
studies, and more, are crucially rele­
vant to Regan's arguments and theo­
ries. His failure to face them and 
respond critically must seriously com­
promise his case. 
In summary: Regan's basic strat­
egy in his defense of animal rights is. 
to stress the simi la rity between 
humans and nonh uman an imals, at the 
expense of de-emphasizing and 
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perhaps deval ui ng that which sets 
humans apart from the animals; 
namely, the moral significance and 
dignity of personhood. That, I sub­
mit, may be an exorbitant and unac­
ceptable moral cost-especially so, 
since there are other grounds upon 
which to articulate and justify a 
human e treatment of animal s. 
II 
RIGHTS AND "INHERENT VALUES" 
Regan has assembled two arguments 
in defen se of the rig hts of animal s; 
the first (just considered) might be 
called "the argument from analogy 
with human rights." The second, 
which appears late in the book 
(essays 6, 8 and 9) is "the- argument 
from inherent value." If the preced­
ing analysis is correct, the first 
argument accomplishes too little (for 
Regan's purposes, at least). The 
second argument, I will contend, 
accomplishes too much. With it, 
Regan seems to be argu'ing what might 
be called "pan -liberationism;" i. e., 
with this argument it is difficult to 
imagine that anything is without 
rights. And if everything has rights, 
then, in effect, nothing has. ("That 
which denotes everything, qualifies 
nothing. tI) 
Consider, then, Regan's concept of 
"inherent value." In explication 
thereof, he writes: 
(1) ... if any given being (x) 
has inherent value, then x's 
having value of this kind is 
logically independent of any 
other being's happening to 
take an interest in or other­
wise valuing x; (2) x's 
having inherent value makes it 
improper (a sign of dis.respect) 
to treat x as though it had 
value only as a means 
... (133) 10 
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The bond that Regan ties between 
"inherent value" and "rights" could 
not be more complete: "all those 
beings (and only those beings) which 
have inherent value have rights." 
(136, cf 139) (In logical notation: 
(x) (IVx ~ Rx) .) Regan's strategy 
then becomes clear: prove (a) the 
above "equivalence proposition," and 
(b) that animals have "inherent 
value," then it will follow (c) that 
animals have rights. Still more, with 
(a) and (b') (the claim that plants, 
rivers, etc., have "inherent value"), 
it will follow (c') that these natural 
entities also have rights. Regan 
believes that this argument establishes 
the foundations for an environmental 
ethic. Why? Because, says Regan, 
"it wou Id seem to be the case that it 
is only if [inanimate natural entities] 
have value of this kind that we can 
develop a genuine ethic of the envi­
ronment, as 
its use." 
Cf. 167.) 
distinct 
(133, 
from 
Regan's 
an ethic for 
emphasis. 
Perhaps the most astonishing 
aspect of this concept is the fact that 
it is monadic-i.e., non-relational. 
While most axiologists regard evalua­
tion as relational, Regan appa rently 
does not. To Regan, values are not 
"values for" or "transactions" between 
evaluator and evaluated. They are 
simply independent and objective 
properties, which we can take or 
leave alone. (199) To some philoso­
phers (this writer included), this 
claim makes as much sense as the fol­
lowing exchange: 
"This thing is bigger" 
"Bigger than what?" 
"Nothing in particular, just bigger" 
In other words, the concept of 
value, some contend, logically 
requires an evaluator; someone to 
whom a property or event matters. 
That there are "independent and 
objective properties" (or, if the Lock­
ean objects, "property-makers") is 
g ra nted. That such properties 
include "values" per se seems con­
trary to the very logic of the con­
cept. 11 Without a n eva Iuato r on the 
scene, the "value" is demoted to the 
status of a value-neutral property, 
"awaiting" evaluation. 
The d ifficu Ities with Rega n' s con­
cept of "inherent value" might become 
clearer if we examine his attempts to 
illustrate the notion. First, cars: 
[It will not] do to argue that 
cars cannot have a good of 
thei r own because what cha r­
acteristics are good making in 
ca rs depends on what ou r 
interests are. For a car has 
those cha racteri stics it has, 
including those that are good 
rna ki ng, quite independently of 
our taking an interest in them. 
( 177) 
The second sentence simply asserts 
what is not in dispute; namely, that 
ca rs have properties. It does not 
support Regan's contention that some 
of these qualities are "inherently 
valuable." Of course these "good­
making qualities" (e.g. of cars) exist 
independently; but the value of these 
qualities is not "independent" of our 
taking an interest in them. He 
writes, fIca rs do not become, say, 
comfortable or economica I by becomi ng 
the objects of our interest." 
Granted, but the value of being "com­
fortable" or "economical" is a matter 
which requires our attention and 
interest. 12 A "good" luxury car is 
not economical; and a "good" racing 
car is not comfortable. The charac­
teristics are independent, but the 
"goodness" of those characteristics 
depends upon our interest in these 
characteristics. (Better, perhaps, 
our "appropriate" or "reasoned" inter­
est in them.) Continuing: 
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If a good car was produced by 
pu rely natu ral means ... that 
would not make it any less a 
good one. It would make it an 
unusual one ... If we were to 
transport a good car from our 
world to a world inhabited by 
beings who did not have the 
interests we have, it would not 
cease to be a good ca r, though 
it wou Id cease to be va Iued as 
one. A good ca r does not lose 
its goodness if we lose our 
interest in it. (177) 
Again, it would be better to say that 
the car would not cease to have the 
qualities deemed (by us) to be good. 
In a word, Regan is once again con­
fus in g here certa in properties of an 
object with the judgment (of value) 
made of those properties. Shouldn't 
we instead say that in this strange 
case it would cease to be "a good 
ca r," even if its properties were not 
altered. When he writes, above, "a 
good ca r does not lose its good ness if 
we lose our interest in it, " all this 
means is that the car would keep the 
properties that we would prize if, 
contra the example, we were there to 
evaluate it-or, for that matter, the 
properties that we now value from our 
hypothetical standpoint as hypothetical 
observers of this fanciful world 
Regan next offers us a floral illus­
tration: 
A luxuriant gardenia, one with 
abundant blossoms and rich, 
deep, green foliage is a better 
gardenia than one that is so 
deformed and stunted that it 
puts forth no blossoms at all, 
and this is quite independently 
of the interests other beings 
happen to take in them. (179) 
If the flower in question IS to be 
found in a florist shop, it is worth 
noting that it is an artifact-an artifi­
cial creation, by a botanist, 
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"assembled" from n~tural (genetic;) 
"media," and designed to appeal to 
human tastes. As such, the "better" 
gardenia must mean "better for us." 
We value the blossoms and foliage. 
Another plant with less blossoms and 
foliage might produce more pol­
len-better for a bee. Or more 
seeds-better for a finch. It might be 
"better for" the gardenia and/or its 
species (whatever' that means) if it 
were allowed togo to seed and repro­
duce! And would this cultivated plant 
survive in the wild as well as its wild 
relatives? Probably not. Does that 
mean that it is not, after all, a "bet­
ter ga rden ia If? Note that these a Iter­
native "evaluations" apply differing 
contexts to Regan's reductive analY$is 
of the ga rden ia per se. (A method, 
by the way, ill-suited for environmen­
tal ethics.) Without context, it just 
makes no sense to talk of something 
as blankly "better." 
There is still worse ahead. Sup­
pose, as Regan argues, that the 
ga rden ia is "good," not to the florist, 
or the bee, or the finch, or even the 
ecosystem-b ut just "good, period. " 
What, then" is a "bad ga rden ia?" A 
bad (or good) anything! How can we 
begin to answer such a question, 
without placing an evaluator into the 
picture, at least hypothetically (thus 
deriving, presumably, a "hypothetical 
value"). Without an answer to such a 
question, or at least a decision proce­
dure, the notion of "inherent value" 
is unbounded-it "underlines every 
word in the book." If the concept 
lacks bou nds, then everything is 
"inherently\ good," and "goodness" 
fails to qualify anything at all. "That 
which denotes everything, connotes 
nothing." 
Has Regan an answer to this objec­
tion? Consider his final words on the 
subject: "Two questions that I have 
not endeavored to answer are: (a) 
what, if anything in general, makes 
something inherently good, and (b) 
 68 E&A V/3 
how can we know, if we can, what 
things are inherently good?1l (202) 
Unfortunately for Regan's argument, 
and his concept of "inherent value," 
these are precisely the questions that 
he must answer if we are to make any 
sense of what he is sayi ng. Without 
answers to these questions, his theory 
has no meaning or justification. He 
has, in effect, declared conceptual 
ban kruptcy, by admitting that he is 
unprepared to "cash in" his concept 
of "inherent value" in the commerce of 
practical moral judgment and experi­
ence. 
III� 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND� 
ETHICS�ENVIRONMENTAL  
Regan admits to bei ng "attracted" 
to the "deep ecologyll approach to 
envi ronmental ethics. (208) But can 
he embrace "deep ecology" without 
seriously compromising h is views on 
animal rights? I think not. 13 His 
primary difficulty follows from his 
commitment to a "rights approach" to 
moral responsibility to animals. As 
Regan correctly perceives, this 
approach "emphasizes the value of 
individuals" (96, cf. 70). Following 
Ronald Dworkin, Regan affirms that 
"the rights of the individual trump 
the goals of the group. (91) It 
would seem to follow, then, that the 
optimum ecosystem, for Regan, would 
be that which best secures the rights 
of each organism therein. 
This is not the approach of deep 
ecology-not if, (as Regan proposes) 
Aldo Leopold is to be a pa radigm of 
"deep ecology. 11 In what is perhaps 
his most widely quoted remark, Leo­
pold wrote: "a thing is right when it 
tends to p reserve the integ rity, sta­
biity and beauty of the biotic commu­
n ity. It is wrong when it tends oth­
e rwise. " 1 4 The re is nota Ik of 
individuals here. "The biotic commu­
nity"-the system and the context-is 
the focus. The whole informs and 
validates the part, while the Ilindivid­
ual" is but a component in the sys­
tem, and the anonymous conveyer of 
evolution. The prey has no Il r ight to 
life;" it must reclaim title to its own 
life in each encounter with its preda­
tors and the elements. While the wolf 
is the enemy of the deer, it is the 
friend of the deer species, which, 
through time and a culling of the 
-"unfit," the wolf makes ever more 
alert and swift. Th us does the pred­
ator contribute to the "integrity, sta­
bility and beauty of the biotic commu­
nity. " 
Consider some other contrasts 
between animal rights and "deep ecol­
ogy.1l To the advocate of animal 
rights, hunting is wicked; in the con-. 
text of the "deep ecological" land 
ethic, hunting could be a moral duty, 
(e.g., in a region where the preda­
tors have been depleted and where, 
as a result, the prey have over­
stocked the ca rryi ng capacity of thei r 
habitat-the Kaibab deer in Northern 
Arizona are the classical example). 
"Rights morality" demands equal 
treatment; "deep ecology" acknowl­
edges the survival of the fittest and a 
differential sign ificance of species and 
individuals to the "integrity" of the 
community. 15 Regan's "rights 
approach" is an explicit extension into 
nature of a humanistic ethic; "deep 
ecology" is an environmental ethic 
derived, in large part, from non-phil­
osophical, scientific origins. 16 
So attached is Regan to the indivi­
dualistic/rights approach that he is 
led to suggest that his concept of 
"inherent value" is the "only" way to 
"develop a genuine ethic of the envi­
ronment, as distinct from an ethic for 
its use. (133) In a word, he sug­
gests that by according rights to the 
most trivial and detachable bits of 
nature, we will gain an environmental 
eth ic by agg regation of the pa rts. It 
never seems to occu r to him to ta ke 
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the ecological perspective seriously, 
thus regarding the "biotic community" 
as a whole system, and then deriving 
the value of the part from its involve­
ment in and contribution to the sys­
temic whole. That, of cou rse, is the 
way Leopold goes about it. 
The basic discord between "animal 
rights" and "deep ecology" might be 
illustrated by a fanciful case. Imag­
ine a national park administrator 
determined to carry out a wildlife 
management pol icy based on Regan r s 
principles of "animal rights"? How 
might he best "liberate" the creatures 
under h is management and protection? 
One might propose that he adopt the 
"deep ecological" approach and just 
leave the natural processes to their 
own cruel devices and let nature take 
its terrible toll. After all, Regan will 
not fau It the predators for doi ng thei r 
thing: "the lamb can have rights 
only against those beings who are 
capable of taking the interests of the 
lamb into account and trying to deter­
mine, on the basis of its interests, as 
well as other relevant considerations, 
what, morally speaking, ought to be 
don e. " ( 18) 1 7 It is not, however , 
quite that simple. For while the 
predators might be excused, the 
hypothetical park administrator may 
not be excused for letting this brutal, 
if natural, business go on. He can 
put a stop to at least some of this 
carnage; indeed, because he can, the 
deer (and other prey) have a right to 
his protection. 
How might he bring all this about? 
First, in order to fulfill his duty to 
minimize needless pain and death, he 
would seek to eliminate, as humanely 
as possible, predator species. It 
wouldn't do, of course, to hunt and 
kill them; rather, their elimination 
would have to be accomplished 
through sterilization. Perhaps DDT 
might be reintroduced into the food 
chain, si nce th is seems to dimi n ish the 
reproductive ability of birds of prey. 
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Carcasses might be laced with contra­
ceptive chemicals, and thus predatory 
mammals would be eliminated while 
avoiding the iniquity of hunting them. 
With the predators removed, it 
would then, of course, become neces­
sary to remove excess herbivores, to 
avoid thei r increase beyond ca rryi ng 
capacity and consequent starvation. 
Since hunting would be unacceptable, 
this control of population might be 
accompl ished th rough selective and 
pa rtially effective bi rth control meth­
ods (again, presumably through the 
use of contraceptive chemicals in food, 
water, etc.). 
Of course, the policy would only 
be partially successful. The elimina­
tion of insect predators would be eco­
nomically unfeasible, if not in fact 
practically impossible. Presumably, 
insectivore birds would also be allowed 
to survive. The primary "beneficiar­
ies" of this "rights-oriented manage­
ment" would be "higher order" herhi­
vores. This would be the policy, 
notwithstanding Regan's insistence 
that all animals have "right to life." 
An interesting consequence of this 
fanciful exercise is the discovery 
that, far from being an "extension" or 
a "foundation" of environmental eth­
ics, vegetarianism and "animal 
rights," unconstrained, run contrary 
to fundamental ecological principles. 
For one thing, by insisting upon the 
"rights" of individual beings to be 
spared unnecessary pain, one loses 
sight of the species and the ecosys­
tem-and the fact that predators, while 
"enemies" of individual prey animals, 
are "benefactors" of the prey species. 
In general, by focusi ng upon the 
ind ividuals, "an imal liberation ists" 
give inadequate attention to contexts 
and systems-the essential concepts of 
the "ecological point of view." In 
short, the "rights approach" can lead 
us far astray from Aldo Leopold's 
"Land Ethic." 
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I'll not go on with a critical task 
that has been superbly performed 
elsewhere. My effort will be success­
ful if I have managed to suggest that 
Regan's subtitle, "Essays on Animals 
Rights and Envi ronmental Eth ics" 
tends, by simple conjunction, to paper 
over a massive theoretical crack-a rift 
that he has not recognized, far less 
attempted to repair, in the body of 
the book. 
IV 
INDIVIDUALISM AND HOLISM: 
TOWARD A SYNTHESIS 
If the foregoing analyses have been 
successful, we have found that indi­
vidualism alone fails as a ground for 
an integrated environmental ethics. 
This failure is most apparent in the 
attempt to extend to aII natu re moral 
categories (such as "rights," and 
"duties") which are' appropriately 
applied within communities of persons. 
However, neither can holism stand 
alone as a basis for a sound environ­
mental ethic. In this final section, I 
would like to suggest (and merely 
that), how these contrasting 
approaches to environmental ethics 
might be integ rated. 
Some holists contend that the com­
ponents of an ecosystem have, by 
themselves, no moral significance 
whatever. 18 That position is extreme 
and untenable. For while we might 
agree with Leopold's maxim that "a 
th i ng is rig ht when it tends to re­p 
'serve the integrity, stability and 
beauty of the biotic community," we 
need not assume from this that Leo­
pold's maxim is the only test of 
"rig htness. " (I am not awa re that 
Leopold makes this claim.) There may 
be other, independent, grounds of 
"rightness." For instance, something 
may also be. "right" if it enhances the 
interests of sentient beings, and still 
more "right" if it serves the interests 
of cognitive sentient beings (such as 
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persons). Hence, in an ecosystem 
with at best only minimally sentient 
life-components (e. g. , an alpine 
la ke), the i nteg rity of the system 
would have a higher moral claim than 
that of the "interest" of a trout, much 
less a dragonfly. In another system, 
containing persons, individuals may 
have valid claims against the "sys­
tem" . 
Thus the moral significance of 
individuals may be perceived as 
increasing incrementally along the 
evol utiona ry line of the development of 
"sentience." In an environmental eth­
ics thus conceived, the feelings of a 
mole might be judged to have some, 
but very little, moral significance 
alongside the significance of the 
"integrity, stability and beauty of the 
biotic community" of which it is a 
part. However, as neuro-mechanisms 
evolve to greater complexity, and 
therefore toward a greater acuteness 
to the experience of pleasu re and 
pain, individualism (the morality of 
"rights") gains moral significance. At 
a certain stage of evolution, neural 
complexity, and the psychic life that 
it supports, reaches a point (perhaps 
past the "quantum leap of person­
hood") at which individuality rates 
very high consideration-often enough 
to trump the demands of ecological 
communities. Thus, for example, a 
pond or a field might justifiably "give 
way" to "development" for a habitat 
for homo sapiens). 
Why should this be so? What is it 
about complex neu ral (ergo psychic) 
life that should afford it this consid­
eration? The question is too large to 
consider this late in the paper. 19 
Briefly, I would suggest ths possibil­
ity: First of all, complex brains sup­
port "sheer sentience," which demands 
immed iate mo ra I attention. 20 In add i­
tion, though less obviously, the 
brai n-and therefore the mi nd, the 
language, the culture, and thus the 
"autobiography-of a person claims 
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significance through its replication of 
the "integrity, stability and beauty" 
of ecosystems. Just as there is, in 
an ecosystem, an ecology of organ­
isms, there is in the life of a person, 
an "ecology of mind" featuring com­
plex i ntereactions between the person­
organism, its nervous system, -the 
natural environment, and the entity 
called "culture" which intervenes 
between organism and natural envi­
ronment. Most immediate to the mind 
of the person-organism is that part of 
his culture which is articulated by 
meaning in his language, and which 
constitutes his "thought-world." This 
"thought-world," in tu rn, . is a com­
plex system of memories, cognitions, 
connations and affections. This 
neural elaboration from brain, through 
language and community, to self-con­
sciousness, culture and "thought­
world," rivals the complexity and 
i nteg ration of the I ife-commu n ity wh ich 
supports it. If, as Leopold asserts, 
"goodness" is grounded in the "integ­
rity, stability and beauty" of ecosys­
tems, then, by displaying these quali­
ties, mi nds too have va Iue. 21 
There are, of cou rse, times when 
the values of ecosystems and the val­
ues of person-communities appear to 
compete-as, similarly, there are con­
flicting demands,' well-known to politi­
cal scientists and moralists, between 
human communities and human individ­
uals. Still, such conflicts of claims 
between Iife-commu nities, huma n com­
munities and human individuals need 
not be exclusive and destructive of 
each other. Perhaps the valid limits 
of the claims of the individual upon 
the community, and the community 
upon the ecosystem, are exceeded 
when these claims th reaten the health 
and integ rity, even th e ex isten ce, of 
the larger systems which sustain the 
claimants. Ultimately, the notion of a 
"competition" between holistic and 
individual values may be false; both 
might be subsumed under a still 
broader holistic system which gives 
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due notice to the values and claims of 
pre-eminently significant parts of the 
ecosystem; namely, the dignity, rights 
and duties of the personalistic compo­
nents of that system. 22 
If this sketch indicates a promising 
avenue of accomodation between indi­
vidualism and holism, it also reveals a 
fatal weakness in Regan's individualis­
tic approach to envi ronmental eth­
ics-namely, the failure of that 
approach to make allowance for the 
incremental moral significance of 
neural complexity. In particular, 
Regan's approach gives no acknowl­
edgmentof the moral significance of 
the quantum leap which takes place 
with the concomitant emergence of 
language, culture and personhood. 
Notice, now, that this sketch has 
made no claim for a higher moral sig­
nificance of members of the species 
homo sapiens. That claim has been 
applied here to persons-beings poss­
essing a type of advanced neural com­
piex ity which, i n t urn, supports Ian ­
guage, self-consciousness and culture. 
Any species might conceivably apply 
to that Club. It is a contingent fact, 
not a logical truth, that only the 
species homo sapiens seems able to 
pass the entrance examination. Other 
beings have been portrayed in fiction 
to be persons (e.g., in the Dr. 000­
litle tales and in the "Star Wars" 
films), and some beings (e.g., dol­
phins, extra-terrestrials, computers) 
may yet in fact be fou nd to be per­
sons. So much for the charge of 
"speciesism. "23 
An uncompromising individualistic 
l!rights-approach" to environmental 
ethics leads to such absurdities as 
were portrayed in the "rights-oriented 
game management." Total commitment 
to a holistic ethic is radically destruc­
tive of the rights and dignity of per­
sons and their communities. Clearly 
an accomodation is called for. I have 
suggested a sol ution wh ich may, or 
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may not, deserve elaboration and then 
survive circumspect analysis. What­
ever the fate of th iss uggestion, it" is 
more important that the challenge be 
raised to the philosophical community 
to scrupulously search for an accomo­
dation and eventual integration" of the 
individualistic and holistic dimensions 
of envi ronmental eth ics. 
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California 
after, all 
book will 
3Th is 
Regan, All 
Berkeley: 
Press, 1982, 
& Animals, 
p. 110. 
That Dwell 
University of 
p. 2. Here­
clear references to Regan's 
be placed in the text. 
characterization of Regan's 
position is supported by the following 
quotations from the book: (a)" 
because [animals'] interests are fre­
quently as important to them as com­
parable interests are to human beings, 
their interests must be given the same 
weight as comparable human inter­
ests." (86) (b)" attempts to 
mark a qualitative chasm that sepa­
rates man from the beasts must 
fa iI. . . " (159) (c ) " Itis not c Iea r , 
first, that no non-human animals sat­
isfy anyone (or all) of these 
[rights'-conferring] conditions, and 
second, it is reasonably clear that not 
all human beings satisfy them." (28) 
4Notably, Joel Feinberg in his 
essay, "The Rights of Animals and 
Unborn Generations," in Blackstone 
(ed), Philosophy and Environmental 
Crisis, Athens, Georgia: University 
of Georgia Press, 1974. 
5Th is is not the place to discuss 
the idea that manifestly "unequal" 
persons deserve "equal rights." The 
literature one the topic is vast, of 
cou rse. The best recent treatments, 
in my opinion, are by Ronald Dworkin 
and John Rawls. 
6Regan's indexed references to 
"persons" (152-3, 156) deal exclu­
sively with "person" as a legal con­
cept-i. e., entities with juridical 
standing. He makes little use of the 
concept of "person" as an integrated 
and continuous set of capacities. 
7Some researchers claim that some 
experimental apes have broken this 
barrier (e. g., the Gardiner's 
"Washoe" and Paterson's "Koko"). 
Still others, (e.g., John Lilly) believe 
that dolphins may be "persons" with 
an articulate language. If so, and if 
this can be demonstrated, then these 
animals are welcome to the club (i. e., 
to our "moral community"). The 
issue, however, is in doubt, to say 
the least. (Cf. Herbert Terrace's 
work with "Nim Chimsky".) 
8By (a) "significant" is meant that 
symbol, "x", evokes the same 
response (or image) in all parties to 
the communication. Other criteria of 
language are (b) syntactical (gram­
matical), (c) conventional, and (d) 
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arbitrary. Cf. Fromkin and Rodman, 
An Introduction to Language, (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1983), Ch. 1. 
9This, however, is not Regan's 
sole criterion of "rights." He further 
contends that ina n imate bei ngs nave 
"rights," due to their "inherent 
va Iu,e. " (Clea rly pia nts, rocks and 
rivers do not "have autobiographies. ") 
More about this shortly. 
l°There is a third feature, of 
which Regan admits in a footnote, "I 
am myself confused about th is pa rt" 
(146); a confusion that I share, and 
thus will spare the reader. 
11But to say that projects, objects 
and events contain "value-makers" (or 
"value-gens," to use Holmes Rolston's 
felicitous term) may be quite accepta­
ble, in that such a notion entails a 
relation with an evaluator. For an 
expanded treatment of the ideas in 
th is section, see my "Va lues in 
Nature: Is Anybody there?", pre­
sented at a conference at the Un iver­
sity of Georgia, "Environmental Eth­
ics: New Directions," October 5, 1984 
[in circulation- publication virtually 
assured]. The following three [ms] 
pages are shared with that paper. 
12Because I don't necessarily wish 
to embrace an interest theory of value 
here, I would say that "attention and 
interest" are necessary for value, 
though not sufficient. Otherwise, we 
are perilously close to subjectivism 
and relativism. 
13My statement of the final objec­
tion will be brief, since I am quite 
unable to improve upon Baird Calli­
cott's superb presentation of the same 
objection in "Animal Liberation: A 
Triangular Affair" (Environmental 
Ethics, 2:4 (Winter, 1980). Callicott's 
article is twice cited, but never ans­
wered, by Regan in this book. 
Another excellent treatment of this 
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issue is Mark Sagoff's "Animal Libera­
tion and Environmental Ethics: Bad 
Marriage, Quick Divorce" Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal, 22:2 (Summer, 1984). 
Thoug h inclose ag reement to those of 
Callicott and Sagoff, my views on this 
issue were arrived at independently. 
14Aldo Leopold, A Sand County 
Almanac, (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1949), 224-5. Regan does 
not cite this passage. 
lsCallicott,327. 
16 Ibid, 321 f . 
17Regan, who is so anxious to dis­
count the differences between humans 
and animals, fails to notice that the 
very qualities that make a man 
responsible, and a wolf not responsi­
ble, are the qualities which make 
human life much more valuable, and 
human rights much more urgent, than 
those of animals without these quali­
ties. 
18Pluhar, p. 120-3, so character­
izes holism, and in defense of this 
characterization, cites Callicott, op. 
cit., 332. 
19 1 examine this question more 
deeply in my "Values in Nature," op. 
cit., and in "Nature as a Moral 
Resou rce, " Environmental Ethics, 6, 
(Summer, 1984). 
2°"Sheer sentience," as a factor in 
moral significance, may be at "moral 
bedrock." The best expression, to 
my knowledge, of this "Cartesian cer­
tainty" of the evil of pain, is from 
Charles Schulz' "Linus": Lucy: 
"Well , why is pa in bad? " Li n us : 
"Because pain hurts!" Beyond this, 
I'm not sure what more can, or need, 
be said. To know pain is to know it's 
prima facie bad (whatever the possibly 
over-riding good results may be). 
Cf. Feinberg on the Interest Princi­
ple, in "Rights of Animals and Unborn 
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Generations," in Blackstone (ed), 
Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, 
Athens, Georgia: University of Geor­-
gia Press, 1974. Also see my "Envi­-
ronmental Ethics: Obstacles and 
Opportunities," in Schultz and 
Hughes, (eds), Ecological Conscious­-
ness, Washington, DC: University 
Press of America, 1981. 
21As a necessary condition for the 
sustenance of communities of persons,· 
the natural system may also be said to 
"draw" significance from the signifi­-
cance of personhood. According to 
the anth ropocentric view, the ecosys­-
tem draws all of its significance ther­-
efrom. 
22Let us not forget that the very 
concept of "morality" presupposes 
personhood: persons are the only 
beings that can be said to have 
duties, or can be meaningfully 
"guilty" or "ashamed" of a violation of 
moral principles. 
23 Analogously, with considerable 
imagination, one might imagine 
"super-persons" (e.g., able to settle 
communal disputes without resort to 
threats of mutual annihilation, or 
capable of selecting communal leaders 
on the basis of intelligence and abil­-
ity, rather than property, power or 
charm). Such beings might then 
exceed "persons" in moral signifi­-
cance. 
